The link among board characteristics, corporate social responsibility performance, and financial performance: Evidence from the hospitality and tourism industry by Uyar, Ali et al.
Murray State's Digital Commons 
Faculty & Staff Research and Creative Activity 
Summer 7-1-2020 
The link among board characteristics, corporate social 
responsibility performance, and financial performance: Evidence 
from the hospitality and tourism industry 
Ali Uyar 
Merve Kilic 
Mehmet Ali Koseoglu 
Cemil Kuzey 
Murray State University, ckuzey@murraystate.edu 
Abdullah S. Karaman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.murraystate.edu/faculty 
 Part of the Business Analytics Commons, Business Intelligence Commons, and the Hospitality 
Administration and Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Tourism Management Perspectives 
on July 2020, available online: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tmp.2020.100714 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by Murray State's Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty & Staff Research and Creative Activity by an authorized administrator of Murray 
State's Digital Commons. For more information, please contact msu.digitalcommons@murraystate.edu. 
1 
 
The link among board characteristics, corporate social responsibility 
performance, and financial performance: Evidence from the hospitality and 
tourism industry 
Abstract 
The aim of this study is twofold: to explore whether board characteristics (i.e. a sustainability 
committee, board independence, board diversity, and board diligence) lead to greater corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) performance, and to test whether CSR performance enhances firms’ 
financial performance in the hospitality and tourism (H&T) industry. Data were collected from the 
Thomson Reuters Eikon database for the H&T firms listed there between 2011 and 2018. We 
employed panel data analysis, after which we ran robustness tests. The results indicated that having 
a CSR committee and female directors on the board are robust factors driving firms to show 
superior CSR performance in all dimensions, including environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG). Independent directors and directors’ diligence selectively enhance the overall CSR score 
and individual pillars of CSR. Investigating the relationship between CSR performance and firms’ 
financial performance did not produce a significant outcome. The findings propose a 
straightforward roadmap for H&T firms and policymakers to identify characteristics of CSR-
friendly boards. 
Keywords: CSR; ESG; social; environmental; governance; firm performance 
1. Introduction 
In the hospitality and tourism (H&T) industry, the basis of the tourism product is the social, 
cultural, and natural capital of a destination (Moneva, Bonilla-Priego, & Ortas, 2019). While the 
H&T industry brings economic and social benefits to destinations, it is criticized for its negative 
impacts on societies and the natural environment, such as climate change, biodiversity loss, air and 
noise pollution, and waste generation (de Grosbois, 2012; Scott, Peeters, & Gossling, 2010). 
Criticisms also arise due to certain sectors within the H&T industry, such as fast-food restaurants 
that cause obesity and casinos that provide opportunities for gambling. This stimulates firms in 
these sectors to focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR) to decrease reputational costs (Rhou 
& Singal, 2020). This places greater pressure on H&T firms to behave responsibly and to undertake 
CSR practices, and thus makes it relevant to study CSR-related issues in the H&T context. 
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There is a growing body of green governance literature which implies that boards should be 
formed in such a way that they put environmental and social concerns high on the priority list of 
the corporate agenda (Mahmood & Orazalin, 2017; Post, Rahman, & Rubow, 2011). In particular, 
a board’s composition, activity, and structure may be influential in fostering firms’ CSR 
commitment. The resource dependence theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) and upper echelons theory (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) indicate that board 
characteristics (BC) play crucial roles in the formulation and implementation of firms’ strategies. 
Abundant studies have addressed the links between BC and CSR practices, particularly regarding 
environment-focused firm practices (Bose, Khan, Rashid, & Islam, 2018; Post et al., 2011; 
Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2016; Wang & Sarkis, 2017). These studies do not deliver a clear message 
on the link between BC—such as board gender diversity, board meeting attendance, non-executive 
board members, and CSR/sustainability committee—and CSR performance (CSRP), including 
environmental, social, and governance performance. Negative impacts of H&T firms’ operations 
on societies and environments justify studying the business case for CSR in the H&T context 
(Rhou & Singal, 2020). However, few studies have examined how CSRP influences financial 
performance related to value-based performance and profitability in the H&T industry; those that 
have mostly documented ambiguous or contradictory findings (Benavides-Velasco, Quintana-
García, & Marchante-Lara, 2014; Franco, Caroli, Cappa, & Del Chiappa, 2019; González-
Rodríguez, Martín-Samper, Köseoglu, & Okumus 2019; Kang, Lee, & Huh, 2010; Moneva et al., 
2019; Singal, 2014; Theodoulidis, Diaz, Crotto, & Rancati, 2017). Therefore, the primary purpose 
of this study is to investigate how firms’ BC influences their CSRP, and to clarify the relationship 
between CSRP and firms’ financial performance. 
To achieve the purpose of this study, we considered firms operating in the H&T industry for 
three reasons. First, in many countries, the H&T industry has a large influence on the social, 
economic, and political environments as an export sector (UNWTO, 2016). Second, the structure 
of the H&T industry or H&T firms is heavily related to the boundaries of several other industries 
(Okumus, Altinay, & Chathoth, 2010). Third, according to Singal (2015), the H&T industry shows 
higher leverage, risk, capital intensity, and competitive rivalry than other industries. These reasons 
imply that H&T firms face challenges or opportunities in formulating and implementing CSR 
strategies designed by firms’ board members. Consequently, BC in H&T firms should identify and 
design efficient CSR practices that affect firms’ financial performance. Several studies link BC to 
3 
 
H&T firms’ performance (Mu Yeh, 2013, 2018, 2019), but the links between BC, CSRP, and 
financial performance in H&T firms are not clear (Guillet & Mattila, 2010). Although Ghaderi, 
Mirzapour, Henderson, and Richardson (2019)1 examined the association between CSRP and hotel 
performance, they used multiple proxies for performance, including financial, reputation, 
productivity, and innovation performance, which does not allow for an assessment of the direct 
association between CSRP and financial performance. Therefore, the findings of this study 
represent a significant contribution to the H&T literature. 
The data for the study were collected from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database regarding 
H&T firms listed between 2011 and 2018. The cross-country nature of the data used in the study 
improves the generalizability of the findings around the world. The data were subject to panel data 
regression analysis with fixed effects estimators to test the hypothesized relationships. After 
running baseline results, several robustness checks were run to verify the outputs. 
After a literature review of CSR in the H&T industry, the study establishes a theoretical 
background and develops the hypotheses. Next, we discuss the research methodology employed 
in this study. Finally, we present and discuss the findings, provide theoretical and practical 
implications, and make suggestions for future studies. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Corporate Social Responsibility in the Hospitality and Tourism Industry 
Although initially CSR research in the H&T sector received less attention than in industries 
that are seen as heavy polluters (i.e. chemicals, manufacturing, and mining), growing concerns 
about the H&T industry’s negative social and environmental impacts have led researchers to pay 
increasing attention to CSR issues in that industry (de Grosbois, 2012)2. However, CSR research 
in the H&T industry is still slow (Mihalic, 2016) and minor compared to the research undertaken 
in heavy polluter industries (Moyeen, Kamal, & Yousuf, 2019). While a strand of research has 
studied the extent of CSR efforts implemented by H&T firms (Khatter, McGrath, Pyke, White, & 
Lockstone-Binney, 2019; Kucukusta, Mak, & Chan, 2013; Suárez-Cebador, Rubio-Romero, 
Pinto-Contreiras, & Gemar, 2018; Tsai, Hsu, Chen, Lin, & Chen, 2010), a further strand has 
 
1 The study was a country-specific study based on a questionnaire survey conducted in Iran. 
2 Please see the papers of Coles et al. (2013), Font and Lynes (2018), Iyer and Jarvis (2019), and Moyeen et al. (2019) 
for an extensive literature review on CSR in the H&T industry. 
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examined the communication of such efforts (de Grosbois, 2012). The association between 
corporate governance and CSR practices in the H&T industry has not yet been examined. This 
study addresses this lack of research by exploring whether and how BC are associated with CSRP 
in the H&T industry. 
A stream of papers have analyzed the impact of CSR practices on various aspects of H&T 
firms’ organizational performance, such as customer loyalty (Gürlek, Düzgün, & Meydan Uygur, 
2017), employees’ work engagement (Gürlek & Tuna, 2019), organization citizenship behavior 
(He, Zhang, & Morrison, 2019), reputation (Ghaderi et al., 2019), and productivity (Ghaderi et al., 
2019). Nevertheless, a limited number of studies have examined the impact of CSR practices on 
firms’ financial performance in the H&T industry (Benavides-Velasco et al., 2014; Franco et al., 
2019; González-Rodríguez et al., 2019; Kang et al., 2010; Singal, 2014; Theodoulidis et al., 
2017)3. Further, most of these studies have focused on a particular sub-industry of the H&T 
industry, such as hotels (Benavides-Velasco et al., 2014; González-Rodríguez et al., 2019) or a 
single country (Benavides-Velasco et al., 2014; González-Rodríguez et al., 2019; Singal, 2014). 
This study adds to the literature by examining the relationship between CSRP and financial 
performance in the H&T industry, covering the sub-industries cruise lines, motels & hotels, 
gaming & casinos, recreation industries & leisure, and bars & restaurants on a global scale. By 
doing so, this study provides more generalizable findings on the relationship between CSRP and 
financial performance in the H&T context. 
2.2. Board Characteristics and Corporate Social Responsibility Performance 
This study examines the association between BC and CSRP using the lenses of resource 
dependence and upper echelons theories. A board of directors has two major functions: monitoring 
(control role) and resource provision (service role) (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). First, monitoring 
managers is important to ensure that their decisions and actions are in line with shareholders’ 
interests, and other stakeholders’ expectations and interests (Godos-Díez, Cabeza-García, Alonso-
Martínez, & Fernández-Gago, 2018). In this context, a board of directors acts as an effective 
monitoring mechanism for protecting stakeholders’ interests (Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-
Álvarez, 2019), ensuring the fulfillment of ethical, social, and environmental responsibilities 
(García Martín & Herrero, 2019), and encouraging the management team to get involved in CSR 
 
3 Please see the paper of Rhou and Singal (2020) for a comprehensive review in the domain. 
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activities (Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez, 2019). Second, the resource dependence theory 
refers to board capital, consisting of human capital (i.e. experience, expertise, knowledge, and 
skills) and relational capital (i.e. network of ties to the external environment and stakeholders) 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The resource-based view defines societal demands as part of the 
external environment (Amran, Lee, & Devi, 2014). This view states that knowledge provided by 
directors about the external environment and stakeholders may help firms to effectively address 
CSR issues and perform better CSR activities (Godos-Díez et al., 2018). Further, the upper 
echelons theory argues that directors’ and executives’ decisions and decision-making processes 
reflect their experience, knowledge, personalities, skills, and values (Hambrick, 2007). These 
upper echelon members with their diverse characteristics affect firms’ strategic decisions related 
to both financial and non-financial issues (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Shahab, Ntim, Chengang, 
Ullah, & Fosu, 2018), and thus their CSRP. 
To better understand the relationship between BC and CSRP, we considered four BC—board 
gender diversity, board diligence, non-executive board members, and CSR/sustainability 
committee—and four CSRP indicators—composite ESG4 score and its three sub-dimensions: 
environmental, social, and governance indicators. Examining these indicators is effective because 
they are used alone or in pairs to identify relationships between them in the manufacturing industry 
(Buchanan, Cao, & Chen, 2018; Chen, Feldmann, & Tang, 2015; García-Sánchez, Hussain, & 
Martínez-Ferrero, 2019; Liao, Luo, & Tang, 2015; McGuinness, Vieito, & Wang, 2017; Wang & 
Sarkis, 2017). In this study, we consider all the BC simultaneously, as components of the model 
seen in Figure 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
This proposed conceptual model addresses linkages between BC and CSRP and, subsequently, 
CSRP and the financial performance of firms. The first four constructs under BC are included 
when considering resource dependence and upper echelons theories because they may drive CSRP 
and the financial performance of firms. 
2.2.1. Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Social Responsibility Performance 
 
4 For this research, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) scores are used to measure the CSRP of H&T firms. 
6 
 
Board gender diversity is the first component of BC in the model. According to the resource-
based view, female directors enhance a board’s monitoring ability by bringing different 
perspectives, knowledge, skills, and experiences to the boardroom (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007). This view suggests that female directors who serve as 
providers of human and relational capital improve a firm’s CSRP by building relations with the 
external environment and all stakeholders (Mallin & Michelon, 2011). From the perspective of 
upper echelons theory, directors with different knowledge, skills, and expertise may influence a 
firm’s strategic decisions, and thus improve its financial and non-financial performance (Shahab 
et al., 2018). Research has shown that female directors tend to have more ethical and social abilities 
than their male counterparts and are more likely to behave socially and environmentally 
responsibly (Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez, 2019). In this context, females in upper 
echelons can urge the board to make relevant decisions concerning CSR issues and encourage 
management to undertake CSR-related activities, which lead to greater CSRP. Empirically, Mallin 
and Michelon (2011) found a significant positive relationship between gender diversity on the 
board and employee relations and human rights performance. Likewise, Bear, Rahman, and Post 
(2010) showed that the number of women board members positively influences CSR strength 
ratings in the firms included in Fortune’s 2009 Most Admired List. Further, García Martín and 
Herrero (2019), Hussain, Rigoni, and Orij (2018), Orazalin and Baydauletov (2020), and Post, 
Rahman, and McQuillen (2015) determined that the presence of female directors improves firms’ 
performance related to CSR. In line with theoretical discussions and prior empirical findings, the 
following hypothesis (H) is proposed: 
H1: Gender diversity on H&T firms’ boards is positively associated with (a) ESG performance, 
(b) environmental performance, (c) social performance, and (d) governance performance as 
components of CSRP. 
2.2.2. Board Diligence and Corporate Social Responsibility Performance 
The second component of BC selected in this study is the average attendance at board 
meetings, due to its effect on the strategy formulation and implementation process (Chou, Chung, 
& Yin, 2013; Gafoor, Mariappan, & Thyagarajan, 2018; Lin, Yeh, & Yang, 2014). There are two 
opposing views regarding the link between board activity and firms’ performance. On the one 
hand, the board meeting frequency is considered to be a sign of board effectiveness, which would 
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lead to better corporate management control (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) and improve firms’ 
performance in terms of financial and non-financial outcomes. On the other hand, a high number 
of meetings may reflect a board’s ineffectiveness, and thus would be negatively associated with 
firms’ performance. 
Several studies (see Eluyela, Akintimehin, Okere, Ozordi, Osuma, Ilogho, & Oladipo, 2018; 
Mishra & Mohanty, 2014; Vafeas, 1999; Webb, 2004) indicated a relationship between the number 
of board meetings and firms’ performance. Further, Burke, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2019) 
documented that the meeting frequency of sustainability committees positively impacts their 
effectiveness. However, the connection between CSRP and board diligence has not been 
investigated, with a few exceptions (Godos-Díez et al., 2018; Hussain et al., 2018). While Hussain 
et al. (2018) determined that frequent board meetings enhance the social performance of firms, 
Godos-Díez et al. (2018) failed to find a significant association between the number of board 
meetings and firms’ CSR engagement. Since the number of meetings is expected to play a vital 
role in the development of CSR strategies, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H2: Board diligence (i.e. the average board meeting attendance rate) in H&T firms’ boards is 
positively associated with (a) ESG performance, (b) environmental performance, (c) social 
performance, and (d) governance performance as components of CSRP. 
2.2.3. Non-Executive Board Members and Corporate Social Responsibility Performance 
The presence of non-executive board members on a firm’s board is the third component of BC 
in the model. This characteristic concern whether there are non-executive directors on a firm’s 
board; the term can be used interchangeably with independent directors (Kiliç, Kuzey, & Uyar, 
2015). Non-executive board members may ensure board independence from management, and 
improve the board’s objectivity and its ability to represent multiple perspectives (Michelon & 
Parbonetti, 2012). Board independence is expected to be positively associated with CSRP, since 
independent directors are relatively less subjected to pressure from managers and shareholders 
than other directors (Hussain et al., 2018) and their mission is to align the interests of shareholders, 
managers, and stakeholders (Fernandes, 2008; Hoitash, 2011; Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, & 
Davidson, 1992). Further, independent directors may successfully address stakeholders’ interests 
by providing new resources and insights and using their contacts and business expertise (Post et 
al., 2015). Empirically, Hussain et al. (2018), Mallin and Michelon (2011), and Post et al. (2015) 
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documented that a higher proportion of independent directors leads to a greater level of CSRP. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
H3: The presence of non-executive board members on H&T firms’ boards is positively 
associated with (a) ESG performance, (b) environmental performance, (c) social performance, 
and (d) governance performance as components of CSRP. 
2.2.4. Corporate Social Responsibility/Sustainability Committee and Corporate Social 
Responsibility Performance 
The last component of BC in the model is CSR/sustainability committees, referring to the 
existence of a sub-committee dedicated to CSR-related issues operating within the firm’s board 
structure. A firm can implement various activities and programs at the board level to better manage 
relations with stakeholders and deal with social and environmental issues, such as establishing a 
particular CSR/sustainability committee (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). The creation of 
CSR/sustainability committees may reflect a firm’s willingness to engage in CSR practices to meet 
stakeholders’ needs (Mallin & Michelon, 2011). According to resource dependence theory, a 
CSR/sustainability committee can be regarded as an important human capital resource element 
that supervises all issues related to CSR activities (Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez, 2019) 
and promotes socially and environmentally responsible management (Amran et al., 2014). In terms 
of empirical evidence, García Martín and Herrero (2019), Godos-Díez et al. (2018), Hussain et al. 
(2018), and Mallin and Michelon (2011) showed that the existence of a board sub-committee 
responsible for CSR issues positively impacted firms’ CSR engagement. In line with theoretical 
discussions and prior empirical findings, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H4: The existence of a sub-committee responsible for CSR activities reporting to H&T firms’ 
boards is positively associated with (a) ESG performance, (b) environmental performance, (c) 
social performance, and (d) governance performance as components of CSRP. 
2.2.5. Corporate Social Responsibility Performance and Financial Performance 
As seen in Figure 1, our model tests the impact of CSRP measured with an aggregate ESG 
score as well as its three dimensions (i.e. environmental, social, and governance) on the financial 
performance of H&T firms. First, the environmental dimension of CSRP has a crucial role in the 
case of the H&T sector, because it is increasingly linked to the quality of the tourism product 
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(Benavides-Velasco et al., 2014). Environment-related practices can provide financial benefits to 
H&T firms, for example, through saving energy and water and being highly valued by stakeholders 
(Suárez-Cebador et al., 2018). Kucukusta et al. (2013) determined that environmental aspects of 
CSR are one of the most important factors impacting willingness to pay, preference to stay, and 
brand image in the hotel industry. Second, the social dimension of CSRP, covering practices such 
as supporting social projects in the local area, implementing equality and non-discriminatory hiring 
policies in the workplace, supplying healthy and certified local food, and adapting facilities for 
disabled customers, can give hotel firms competitive advantages (Tsai et al., 2010). Regarding the 
social dimension, Ghaderi et al. (2019) argued that support for community and society well-being 
and the protection of local culture and heritage may significantly improve hotels’ financial 
performance, reputation, productivity, and innovation capabilities. Third, good corporate 
governance practices ensure effective monitoring by the board and give companies the ability to 
address stakeholders’ demands properly (Moneva et al., 2019). A proper response to stakeholders’ 
expectations and demands enhances corporate reputation (Ghaderi et al., 2019) and legitimacy 
(Cullinan, Mahoney, & Roush, 2018), resulting in greater financial performance. Consequently, 
CSR practices in terms of environment, society, and governance are expected to lead to better 
financial results in the H&T sector. 
The literature provides mixed results about how CSR activities influence firms’ performance 
(Jamali & Karam, 2018). McWilliams and Siegel (2000) found that CSR’s impact on financial 
performance is neutral. Many studies (Bird, Hall, Momentè, & Reggiani, 2007; Orlitzky, Schmidt, 
& Rynes, 2003; Saeidi, Sofian, Saeidi, Saeidi, & Saaeidi, 2015; Wang & Sarkis, 2017) 
demonstrated a positive relationship between CSR activities and financial performance, while 
other studies (Lima Crisóstomo, de Souza Freire, & Cortes de Vasconcellos, 2011) indicated a 
negative relationship. Wang and Sarkis (2017) clarified the link between CSRP and financial 
performance by considering value-based performance (Tobin Q) and profitability (return on assets 
[ROA]) via a sample of 1,980 firm-year observations from the top 500 green companies in the 
United States over 2009–2013. With a particular focus on the H&T industry, a number of studies 
(Benavides-Velasco et al., 2014; Boluk, 2013; Ghaderi et al., 2019; Qu, 2014; Zhu, 2013) 
examined the influence of CSR activities on financial performance and documented that greater 
CSRP results in better financial outcomes. Therefore, the last hypothesis is: 
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H5: CSRP components (a) ESG performance, (b) environmental performance, (c) social 
performance, and (d) governance performance in H&T firms are positively associated with the 
financial performance of firms measured via (a) value-based performance (Tobin Q) and (b) 
profitability (ROA). 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Sample 
The data for this study were collected from the Thomson Reuters Eikon (hereafter Eikon) 
database for H&T firms listed between 2011 and 2018. The Eikon database contains some of the 
broadest and deepest firm-level financial analysis data accessible. It provides industry-leading data 
including financial news, stock price data, financial ratios, BC, board meeting attendance, CSR 
committees, ESG scores, and company fundamentals (corresponding to 99% of the global market 
capitalization extending over 150 countries and more than 72,000 listed companies), among others. 
The Eikon database also allows for the retrieval of ESG-related data on thousands of firms 
(Refinitiv, 2019a). 
The Eikon database classifies firms into 10 main economic sectors, 28 business sectors, and a 
further 54 industry groups according to their activities. It lists H&T as one of the industry groups, 
including cruise lines, motels & hotels, gaming & casinos, recreation industries & leisure, and bars 
& restaurants (Refinitiv, 2019b). Hence, all data for these industries were retrieved from the Eikon 
database. Prior studies using financial and ESG data as well as BC data retrieved from the Eikon 
database include Arayssi, Jizi, and Tabaja (2019), Dell’Atti, Trotta, Iannuzzi, and Demaria (2017), 
Gallego-Álvarez and Pucheta-Martínez (2020), and Helfaya and Moussa (2017). The BC 
(including board gender diversity, board diligence, board independence, CSR committee, and 
board size), ownership-related data (free float percentage), and financial control variables (such as 
firm size, leverage, and profitability) were selected based on De Beelde and Tuybens (2015), Liao, 
Lin, and Zhang (2018), and Uyar, Karaman, and Kilic (2020). 
Dell’Atti et al. (2017), Luo, Wang, Raithel, and Zheng (2015), and Wang, Hsieh, and Sarkis 
(2018) used ESG scores as proxies for CSRP. The ESG scores range between 0 (worst) and 100 
(best) (Dell’Atti et al., 2017). The Eikon database’s ESG scores are computed from firm-reported 
data and are tailored to openly and objectively evaluate a firm’s ESG performance, commitment, 
11 
 
and potency across 10 matters: innovation, emissions, resource use, human rights, workforce, 
management, product responsibility, CSR strategy, shareholders, and community. ESG data are 
available for more than 7,000 companies going back to 2002; however, a smaller number of firms’ 
ESG scores are disclosed in earlier years. ESG scores (as used in this study) enhance and replace 
the previously well-known Asset4® Equal Weighted Ratings. The ESG data correspond to 70% of 
worldwide market capitalization, including 178 critical ESG metrics. 
The Eikon’s ESG performance percentile ranking methodology calculates relative ranks. The 
methodology calculates 10 category scores (for resource use, emissions, etc.) based on the number 
of companies that have (a) a score, (b) a poorer score than the current firm, and (c) the same score 
(Refinitiv, 2020). The 10 category scores are then added up to environmental, social, and corporate 
governance scores and the final ESG score5. Category scores are the sum of (equally weighted) 
pertinent individual critical ESG indicators (Refinitiv, 2020). The Environment Pillar score 
assesses firms’ performance in evading environmental risks and caring for the environment under 
three categories: emissions, resource use, and innovation scores (Refinitiv, 2020). The Social Pillar 
score evaluates how firms maintain diversity and equal opportunity within the workforce, comply 
with human rights, promote community development, and deliver goods and services in a safe and 
healthy way (Refinitiv, 2020). The Governance Pillar score measures firm management’s ability 
and success in communicating firms’ CSR practices with stakeholders, treating shareholders 
equally, and implementing corporate governance principles (Refinitiv, 2020). 
The initial sample size of the research data set was 940 firm-year records. Data preprocessing 
is a crucial step before further analysis. Therefore, the raw data set was subjected to multiple 
imputation and outlier detection. Initially, the variables with missing values were imputed. 
Furthermore, outliers were detected using a minimum covariance determinant (MCD) estimator to 
robustify the Mahalanobis distances (Verardi & Dehon, 2010). Following the MCD multivariate 
outlier detection approach, 20 extreme firm-year records were removed from the data set. The final 
sample size was 920 firm-year records. Additionally, the leverage control variable had a high 
range, with a high dispersion around the mean value. Therefore, it was winsorized in both tails at 
one percent to replace the extreme values in both tails. 
 
5 Refinitiv (2020) includes the detailed ESG percentile scoring methodology. 
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The sample included 172 firms. The number of firms within each year in the panel data is not 
stable. There are 78 firms in 2011, 88 firms in 2012, 90 firms in 2013, 96 firms in 2014, 111 firms 
in 2015, 138 firms in 2016, 154 firms in 2017, and 165 firms in 2018. The final sample was 920 
firm-year records6. 
3.2. Variables 
We adopted five sets of variables for the dimensions in this study: CSRP, firm performance, 
BC, ownership structure, and financial variables. First, CSRP was proxied by the composite ESG 
score, as well as its three individual scores (Eliwa, Aboud, & Saleh, 2019; Garcia, Mendes-Da-
Silva, & Orsato, 2017). Second, firm performance was assessed by two well-known and frequently 
used financial performance indicators, namely Tobin Q and ROA (Inoue & Lee, 2011; Kang et al., 
2010, 2010; Rhou, Singal, & Koh, 2016; Wang & Sarkis, 2017). While Tobin Q is a market-based 
performance indicator, ROA is an accounting-based one. Tobin Q takes into account the market 
value of firms on the stock exchange. ROA considers net income and total assets, which are both 
drawn from financial statements (i.e. income statement and balance sheet). Therefore, these two 
measures assess different aspects of firm performance. Within the framework of this study, while 
Tobin Q assesses whether shareholders attach value to firms’ CSRP, ROA measures whether 
CSRP enhances firm profitability through improving sales as well as controlling costs. Third, BC 
were measured by board diversity, board diligence, board independence, having a CSR committee 
at the board level, board size (as a control variable), and CEO duality (as a control variable) 
(Chams & García-Blandón, 2019; Naciti, 2019; Yekini, Adelopo, Andrikopoulos, & Yekini, 
2015). Fourth, ownership structure was proxied by free float percentage (i.e. the rate of shares not 
owned by controlling shareholders and freely traded by investors) (Black, De Carvalho, & Gorga, 
2010; Kuzey & Uyar, 2017). Fifth, financial variables, such as firm size, leverage, and profitability, 
were incorporated as control variables (Kang et al., 2010; Rhou et al., 2016; Youn, Hua, & Lee, 
2015). These financial variables were included as control variables for measuring CSRP for the 
following reasons: larger firms endure more public scrutiny in terms of environmental and social 
sensitivity; highly leveraged firms alleviate the sustainability concerns of credit providers and 
reduce borrowing costs through CSR engagement; and profitable firms have higher financial 
 
6 The country distribution of the firms included in the sample is available from the authors. Due to space constraints, 
we did not include this in the paper. 
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capacity to make costly CSR investments (Kuzey & Uyar, 2017). These variables were included 
as control variables for measuring firms’ financial performance for the following reasons: firm 
size may impact firms’ financial performance through economies of scale (Lee, 2009); and 
leverage influences firms’ financial performance due to its disciplining role (González, 2013) and 
the provision of capital for investment (Vithessonthi & Tongurai, 2015). The definitions of the 
variables used in this study are provided in Table A in the Appendix. 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows a summary of the sample with the included variables. The descriptive statistics 
concerning CSRP indicated that the mean ESGscore is 49.66% ± 17.23%, the ENVpilscore is 
50.71% ± 21.08%, the SOCpilscore is 51.55% ± 21.72%, and the GOVpilscore is 46.29% ± 
19.73%. Additionally, the BC showed that the mean Bindepend is 73.55% ± 16.18%, Bdiversity 
is 16.10% ± 12.32%, and Bdiligence is 87% ± 10.44%. The mean values of the financial variables 
indicated that leverage is 60.93% ± 27.62%, profitability is 6.86% ± 7.12%, and Tobin Q is 1.87 
± 1.50. The firm-year records indicated that 46.20% of the firms have CSR committees and 45% 
demonstrate the existence of CEOduality. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
3.4. Correlation Analysis 
Table 2 presents the bivariate linear relationship with respect to Pearson’s correlation analysis. 
According to the analysis results, ESGscore, ENVpilscore, SOCpilscore, and GOVpilscore have 
significant positive linear relationships with CSRcommittee, Bindepend, Bdiversity, and 
Bdiligence (p < 0.05). In addition, Tobin Q has no significant linear association with ESGscore, 
ENVpilscore, and GOVpilscore (p > 0.05), but a significant negative linear association with 
SOCpilscore (p < 0.05). Profitability has no significant linear relationship with ESGscore, 
SOCpilscore, and GOVpilscore (p > 0.05), but a significant negative linear relationship with 
ENVpilscore (p < 0.05). 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
3.5. Empirical Methodology 
This study uses two models: Model 1 is to test the association between BC and CSRP, and 
Model 2 is to examine the association between CSRP and financial performance. Both models 
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were subjected to panel data regression analysis with fixed effects estimators. The research data 
are based on firm-year panel data. The records include repeated observations for the same variables 
for eight years between 2011 and 2018. Due to the data structure, we used panel data regression 
analysis with fixed effects estimators as the primary research analysis tool to test the proposed 
hypotheses. The two models are formulated based on the hypotheses as: 
yit = α + xitβ +υi + ϵit    (1) 
In Model 1, “yit” shows CSRP, “xit” shows the BC and control variables, “υi + ϵit” is the error 
term, the index “i” represents firm and the index “t” represents year. CSRP is proxied by ESGscore, 
ENVpilscore, SOCpilscore, and GOVpilscore, while BC is proxied by CSRcommittee, Bindepend, 
Bdiversity, and Bdiligence. Similarly, in Model 2 “yit” represents firm performance and “xit” 
represents CSRP and the control variables, while firm performance is proxied by two indicators: 
Tobin Q and profitability (ROA). 
To decide between using a random effects estimator and a fixed effects estimator, we 
employed Hausman’s specification test (Hausman, 1978). The Hausman’s test results showed that 
the null hypothesis (H0: Difference in coefficients not systematic—random effects) is rejected (p-
values < 0.05) in Model 1 and Model 2. Thus, the individual-level effects sufficiently modeled by 
a random effects estimator are rejected in favor of a fixed effects estimator. 
4. Findings and Discussion 
The results of Model 1 with fixed effects estimators are shown in Table 3. Accordingly, 
CSRcommittee (p < 0.01), Bindepend (p < 0.01), Bdiversity (p < 0.01), and Bdiligence (p < 0.05) 
have a significant positive relationship with ESGscore (Column 1) and GOVpilscore (Column 4). 
In addition, CSRcommittee (p < 0.01) and Bdiversity (p < 0.01) have a significant positive 
association with ENVpilscore, but Bindepend and Bdiligence have no significant association with 
ENVpilscore (Column 2). Finally, CSRcommittee (p < 0.01), Bdiversity (p < 0.01), and Bdiligence 
(p < 0.05) have a significant positive relationship with SOCpilscore, but Bindepend has no 
significant relationship with SOCpilscore (Column 3). These results confirm the validity of H1 
and H4 and all their sub-hypotheses, and support the main hypotheses of H2 (a, c, d) and H3 (a, d) 
with some of their sub-hypotheses. The results are discussed in line with prior studies in the 
following paragraphs, but theoretical and practical implications are suggested in the last section of 
the study. 
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The evidence concerning the association between board gender diversity and CSRP or 
reporting is mixed in the literature depending on the context. While some studies conducted in 
developed countries found a positive relationship between the proportion of females on boards and 
CSRP (García Martín & Herrero, 2020; Mallin & Michelon, 2011), other studies implemented in 
emerging countries found a negative relationship (Gallego-Álvarez & Pucheta-Martínez, 2020; 
Muttakin, Khan, & Subramaniam, 2015). The contrasting evidence might arise from the 
empowerment or skills of female directors in these two types of countries. Although these studies 
shed light on the role of female directors in CSR practices, they were not conducted for the H&T 
industry; accordingly, they do not provide sectoral implications. The findings of our study show 
that female directors are influential in all dimensions of CSRP, implying that they are an important 
mechanism of firm governance in pursuing CSR goals in the H&T industry. 
Few studies have investigated the link between board diligence and the CSRP or disclosure of 
firms (García Martín & Herrero, 2020; Giannarakis, 2014; Hussain et al., 2018). The cited studies 
mostly used the number of meetings rather than directors’ board meeting attendance rate, as in our 
study. The number of board meetings alone does not play a precise role in the efficiency of board 
meetings; García Martín and Herrero (2020) and Hussain et al. (2018) propose two contrasting 
views that more frequent meetings may indicate efficiency as well as inefficiency of board 
meetings. Their findings appear to be in line with other contradicting perspectives: Hussain et al. 
(2018) found a positive association between board meeting frequency and environmental 
performance, but not social performance; García Martín and Herrero (2020) found a positive 
association between board meeting frequency and environmental performance7; and Giannarakis 
(2014) found that board meeting frequency had a neutral effect on CSRP. However, our study uses 
a better proxy for board diligence: directors’ board meeting attendance rate (Lin et al., 2014). 
Unlike the number of meetings, directors’ participation reflects the efficiency of corporate board 
meetings. In line with the theoretical proposition, we found that the higher the directors’ meeting 
attendance rate, the higher the composite CSRP as well as social and governance performance. 
This finding justifies that board diligence enhances the monitoring effectiveness of directors on 
boards (Yekini et al., 2015). 
 
7 This study used only the environmental dimension of CSRP. 
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Independent board members are tough monitors and aim to align the interest of managers with 
those of shareholders (Adams & Ferreira, 2007). With the growing importance of CSR, recent 
studies proposed that independent directors may also align the interests of firms with those of 
stakeholders (Gallego-Álvarez & Pucheta-Martínez, 2020), and tested this proposition by 
incorporating board independence in CSR studies. However, the findings are inconclusive; some 
studies found that board independence improves CSR engagement (Arayssi et al., 2019; Gallego-
Álvarez & Pucheta-Martínez, 2020), others found that it decreases (Adel, Hussain, Mohamed, & 
Basuony, 2019), and still others found a neutral effect (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Therefore, 
our study provides additional evidence of the influence of independent directors on CSRP. The 
findings show independent directors’ limited interference in CSR issues; while they are influential 
in the governance dimension of CSR, they are not at all influential in the environmental and social 
dimensions. 
Moreover, the findings of prior studies regarding the association between CSR committees 
and CSRP or reporting largely proved the existence of a positive relationship between the two 
variables, regardless of context, although there are some exceptions. While some European studies 
found a positive association between CSR committee and CSRP (Adel et al., 2019; García Martín 
& Herrero, 2020), another study sampling European and US firms found only a weak association 
between CSR committee and the social dimension of CSR disclosure, but not other dimensions; 
the authors attribute this situation to the immaturity or small proportion of CSR committees in the 
sampled firms (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Past evidence also indicated that CSR committees 
are influential in fostering CSR practices of firms in emerging countries (Arayssi et al., 2019; 
Gallego-Álvarez & Pucheta-Martínez, 2020). As sectoral evidence, Uyar et al. (2020) proved that 
logistics firms with CSR committees are more likely to publish a higher number of CSR reports 
over the years. Therefore, the finding of this study is in line with those of most prior studies and 
demonstrates that CSR committees are influential particularly in the H&T industry’s CSR 
commitment. H&T firms with CSR committees are more likely to achieve higher composite CSRP 
as well as greater environmental, social, and governance performance. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Moreover, in Model 2, we tested whether firm financial performance proxied by Tobin Q (i.e. 
market-based performance) and ROA (i.e. accounting-based performance) is associated with 
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CSRP. Table 4 provides the panel data regression with fixed effects analysis results for this 
investigation. The testing CSRP variables proxied by ESGscore, ENVpilscore, SOCpilscore, and 
GOVpilscor are not simultaneously subjected to the panel regression analysis due to their high 
correlation (see the correlation analysis results in Table 2). Therefore, the risk of multicollinearity 
is eliminated. 
Initially, the results showed that ESGscore, ENVpilscore, SOCpilscore, and GOVpilscore 
have no significant association with Tobin Q in (p-values > 0.05, Columns 1–4). Additionally, the 
results of the relationship between CSRP and profitability (ROA) as another indicator of firm 
performance revealed that ESGscore (p-value < 0.10) and GOVpilscore (p-value < 0.10) have 
weak significant negative relationships with ROA, SOCpilscore (p-value < 0.05) has a significant 
negative relationship with ROA, and ENVpilscore has no significant relationship with ROA 
(Columns 5–8). Thus, H5 is not supported, revealing that CSRP does not necessarily lead to 
positive financial performance in the H&T industry. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
The association between CSRP and financial performance is argued on two contrasting 
grounds: one approach is that CSR causes firms to incur additional costs and thus reduces firms’ 
financial performance; another is that CSR promises competitive advantage in the marketplace and 
thus increases firms’ performance (Lee, Seo, & Sharma, 2013). In line with these two conflicting 
views, the findings of prior studies are inconclusive. While Inoue and Lee (2011) found an 
insignificant association between CSRP and financial performance in most of the study models, 
they determined rarely positive and negative associations depending on the tourism subsector 
chosen, dependent variable specification (ROA or Tobin Q) or chosen sub-CSR dimension. Youn 
et al. (2015) proved a positive link for larger firms rather than the overall sample in the restaurant 
industry. Drawing on a synthesis of a comprehensive literature review, Coles, Fenclova, and Dinan 
(2013) concluded that the findings on the CSRP and firm performance nexus are unequivocal. In 
line with these prior studies, our results also did not produce consistent outcomes; while the fixed 
effects estimator did not yield any significant result for Tobin Q, composite CSRP as well as social 
and governance indicators produced significant negative results for ROA, confirming the approach 
that CSR causes additional costs. 
4.1. Robustness Checks 
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Model 1 and Model 2 were subjected to robustness checks using ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression analysis. Table 5 presents Model 1’s analysis results. The results confirmed all the 
significant relationships except one (between Bindepend and GOVpilscore) found in Table 3. 
Moreover, the insignificant associations between Bindepend and ENVpilscore, Bindepend and 
SOCpilscore, and Bdiligence and ENVpilscore obtained in Table 3 were all found significant (p < 
0.01) in robustness tests. We conclude that the findings regarding the BC driving CSRP are robust 
compared to alternative methodologies. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
Similarly, Model 2 was also subjected to robustness checks using OLS. The results are given 
in Table 6. Based on the obtained results, none of the CSRP indicators has a significant association 
with Tobin Q, which indicates consistency with the initial analysis. Only ESGscore (p-value < 
0.05) and GOVpilscore (p-value < 0.01) have a significant positive association with profitability, 
contrary to the negative associations obtained in Table 4. Hence, it can be said that the association 
between CSRP and ROA varies depending on the methodology chosen. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
5. Conclusions 
In this study, we tested and explored whether the characteristics of corporate boards are likely 
to affect the CSRP of H&T companies, and whether CSRP plays a role in enhancing firms’ 
performance. We hope that our study will help sector representatives design corporate structures 
that enhance their CSRP. Our study draws significant conclusions that are robust compared to 
alternative methodologies and are based on a cross-country sample. 
The results suggest that CSR committees make a significant difference in driving firms’ CSR 
engagements. This result is confirmed for the composite ESG score and individual ESG pillars, 
including environmental, social, and governance. This implies that CSR committees are influential 
in pursuing CSR goals and addressing stakeholders’ demands in all dimensions. Our findings 
validate the necessity of board sub-committees, in which specific tasks are assigned to fewer 
decision-makers. Second, an independent board of directors is particularly effective in improving 
firms’ overall CSR commitments and the governance pillar. This might mean that independent 
directors are appointed to boards to strengthen the governance structure, through which long-term 
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value generation is enabled and shareholders’ interests are met. Third, the ratio of female directors 
on boards is highly influential in driving firms to engage with all CSR dimensions. The findings 
and propositions of prior studies assert that women are more philanthropically driven and 
community-oriented, have diverse perspectives, and bring unique experiences and competencies 
to boards. Fourth, disciplined directors also contribute to the composite score and the social and 
governance pillars of CSR engagement. By participating in board meetings, directors have a 
chance to be knowledgeable about CSR investments, vote for investing in specific CSR projects, 
and follow up on the outcomes of those projects, since those meetings are the primary decision-
making platform for such investments. Finally, CSRP does not enhance firms’ performance as 
proxied by both value-based and accounting-based indicators. 
6. Theoretical and Practical Implications 
The findings imply that the resource dependence and upper echelons theories explain the 
CSRP of H&T firms well. In line with the resource dependence theory, female directors and CSR 
committees might enrich H&T firms’ CSR agenda, engagement with their experience, expertise, 
knowledge, and skills, and communication of CSRP with external parties. In line with the upper 
echelons theory, the study proves the influence of upper level corporate structure and meetings on 
corporate decision-making and shaping firms’ CSR practices. The only weak link between board 
structure and CSRP is the effect of independent directors on CSRP. For each of the hypothesized 
links, the study provides practical implications in the following paragraphs. 
The findings propose a straightforward roadmap for H&T firms and policymakers to follow 
to identify the characteristics of CSR-friendly boards that pursue, monitor, and prioritize the CSR 
commitment of firms. First, as CSR committees and gender diverse boards improve all types of 
CSR engagements, H&T sector representatives may formulate or redesign corporate policies to 
establish specific CSR committees and open seats to female directors on the boards. The findings 
highlight the importance of board structure in pursuing CSR goals as the ultimate decision-making 
body in corporations. It is hoped that CSR policies shaped at board level might have a domino 
effect on the lower hierarchical levels of management and human resource structure, ultimately 
aligning H&T firms with more environmentally and socially responsible practices. Already 
existing rates of CSR committees (46.2%) and board diversity (16.1%) can be raised. However, 
the scarcity of women in the sector might be a symptom of gender inequality in the H&T academia 
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since Khoo-Lattimore, Yang, and Je (2019) point out underrepresentation of women in tourism-
related academic conferences and calling for more women participation in the events. In 2010, the 
United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) also released a report highlighting the 
gender gap in international tourism (Khoo-Lattimore, Yang, & Je, 2019). At this point, H&T 
schools may undertake an important role to educate future women leaders and practitioners by 
countering gender discrimination (if exists), updating curricula, teaching soft skills along with hard 
skills which eventually may serve to empower women in the sector (Mooney, 2020).  Second, as 
board diligence is a significant predictor of composite CSRP as well as social and governance 
pillar performance, it implies that social and managerial issues of H&T firms are the subjects of 
board meetings. However, as board diligence is not a significant predictor of the environmental 
pillar, it might signal that environmental issues are not prioritized on the corporate agenda as much 
as other CSR issues. Hence, the environmental dimension of CSR requires closer attention in board 
meetings and from directors of H&T firms due to the sector’s negative influence on the 
environment (e.g. carbon emissions from air transportation and accommodation), as well as its 
economic self-interest in protecting the environment. 
Third, despite the high rate of independent directors on boards (73.55%), they have limited 
influence on the CSR commitment of H&T firms; they have an effect on the composite CSR score 
as well as the governance pillar. This finding casts doubt on the efficacy or responsibility of 
independent directors regarding environmental and social issues. This situation can be explained 
by the fact that they might focus on financial issues and oversight of managers to secure the 
interests of shareholders. They may consider environmental and social initiatives as nonessential 
and regard them as activities that distract them from their primary goal of pursuing shareholders’ 
interests. Moreover, independent directors might leave environmental and social issues to the 
discretion of CSR committees and female directors. 
Fourth, the findings may help policymakers advance CSR implementation in the H&T sector. 
As the study connects board configuration to CSRP, policies can be developed for better 
configuration of boards and improvement of CSRP. For policymakers, one way is to formulate 
corporate governance codes to address board structure, such as fixing the rates of female and non-
executive directors on boards, requiring firms to establish CSR committees, and setting a meeting 
attendance rate for directors. Another way is to take or suggest concrete steps to alleviate the 
environmental degradation caused by the H&T sector and enhance social engagement, such as 
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community development. This can be done through governmental and non-governmental tourism 
offices or other local bodies concerned with tourism activities. 
Finally, the insignificant association between CSRP and firms’ financial performance implies 
that CSR initiatives may not yield financial returns in the short term. Firms may have to wait a 
long time to realize the financial benefits of such initiatives. Another plausible explanation is that 
the H&T sector may expect non-financial benefits (i.e. achieving social legitimacy or community 
development) rather than financial gains from CSR activities. Alternatively, the stock market may 
not be efficient enough, as it does not reflect CSR information in share values, which may indicate 
that firms are not sufficiently communicating their CSR activities with their shareholders8. At this 
point, we think that female directors might play a significant role in turning CSR efforts to firm 
performance as there are some studies which found a positive association between board diversity 
and firm performance (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes, & 
Laffarga, 2017). They can do that by building relations with the external environment and 
stakeholders (Mallin & Michelon, 2011) through traditional and conventional communication 
technologies. Hence, corporations might develop new strategies for marketing and investor 
relations for better benefiting from female directors in improving not solely CSR performance but 
also financial performance. However, to do that, the existing female proportion on boards (16.1%) 
may not be sufficient suggesting the need for opening more room to females on boardrooms. Some 
studies even suggest regulatory intervention by governmental authorities to raise women 
proportion on boards through corporate governance codes (Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017) as some 
European countries do (Jiraporn, Bouattour, Hamrouni, & Uyar, 2019). Moreover, the insignificant 
association between CSRP and profitability might signal that CSR initiatives are costly 
investments that do not allow for improved net income on the income statement. If this is the case, 
H&T firms should try to translate CSR initiatives into higher levels of sales revenue to ultimately 
improve profitability. They can do this by developing better customer and public relations with 
the help of their marketing and customer relations units. 
The findings should be considered in light of two main limitations. The sample comprises 
H&T firms for the years between 2011 and 2018. Therefore, the results may not be generalizable 
for other sectors or may not be valid before the year 2011. The validity of the results could be 
 
8 This comment is relevant particularly for a market-based performance indicator (i.e. Tobin Q). 
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checked in other environmentally sensitive industries, such as energy, logistics, aviation, 
chemicals, and mining. Future studies could consider institutional or country-level factors beyond 
firm-level indicators to check whether they are influential in motivating firms to perform CSR 
activities. Particularly for the H&T sector, binding regulations, sanctions or civil society influence 
may be more powerful in some countries; this could potentially force sector representatives to 
undertake certain CSR exercises. Finally, the insignificant association between CSRP and financial 
performance justifies future investigations. Moderators such as the quality of the institutional 
environment or the size of the tourism sector could be incorporated in the study models. 
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Appendix 
Table A 
The list of variables, their definitions and the source* 
Variables Definition 
ESGscore Composite CSR score including environmental, social and corporate governance initiatives 
ENVpilscore Environmental score which assesses a firm’s impact on ecosystems. 
SOCpilscore Social score evaluates a company’s engagements to address employees’, customers’, and 
society’ expectations. 
GOVpilscore Governance score measures the extent of which a firm’s board members and executives 
ensure long-term shareholder interest. 
CSRcommittee Presence of a board-level CSR committee/team in the firm 
Bindepend Board independence as calculated by the ratio of non-executive members on the board 
Bdiversity Board diversity as measured by the ratio of female members on the board 
Bdiligence Board diligence as proxied by board meeting attendance rate of directors 
Bsize Board size as proxied by the number of directors on the board at the end of the fiscal year 
CEOduality Specifies whether CEO chairs the board simultaneously 
Freefperc Free float as a percentage of shares outstanding 
Firmsize Natural logarithm of total assets of a company 
Leverage The proportion of total liabilities to total assets 
Profitability The ratio of net income (after taxes) to total assets 
Tobin Q The total of market capitalization and total debt divided by total assets 
* All data were collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon database. 
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Figure 1 
Hypothesized model of the study 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics (N = 920) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ESGscore 49.66 17.23 12.65 92.17 
ENVpilscore 50.71 21.08 15.95 98.68 
SOCpilscore 51.55 21.72 6.53 98.92 
GOVpilscore 46.29 19.73 5.36 92.28 
Bindepend 73.55 16.18 0.00 100.00 
Bdiversity 16.10 12.32 0.00 57.14 
Bdiligence 87.00 10.44 5.00 100.00 
Bsize 9.19 2.74 1.00 26.00 
Freefperc 74.23 23.15 4.06 100.00 
Firmsize 21.71 1.41 17.66 24.48 
Leverage 60.93 27.62 5.55 202.97 
Profitability 6.86 7.12 -23.75 34.11 
Tobin Q 1.87 1.50 0.00 9.39 
 Category  Frequency Percent 
CSRcommittee Exist  425 46.20 
 Does not exist  495 53.80 
 Total  920 100.00 
CEOduality Exist  414 45.00 
 Does not exist  506 55.00 
 Total  920 100.00 
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Table 2 
Pearson’s correlation analysis 
Variables V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 
1: ESGscore 1        
2: ENVpilscore 0.878* 1       
3: SOCpilscore 0.899* 0.761* 1      
4: GOVpilscore 0.666* 0.346* 0.386* 1     
5: CSRcommittee 0.687* 0.687* 0.623* 0.349* 1    
6: Bindepend 0.281* 0.214* 0.339* 0.116* 0.103* 1   
7: Bdiversity 0.372* 0.262* 0.319* 0.345* 0.173* 0.223* 1  
8: Bdiligence 0.142* 0.120* 0.110* 0.123* 0.185* -0.193* -0.024 1 
9: Bsize 0.392* 0.416* 0.380* 0.140* 0.354* 0.241* 0.175* -0.160* 
10: CEOduality -0.013 0.078* -0.097* -0.004 -0.032 0.098* -0.115* -0.363* 
11: Freefperc 0.162* 0.092* 0.190* 0.112* 0.072* 0.326* 0.249* -0.181* 
12: Firmsize 0.411* 0.424* 0.357* 0.215* 0.276* 0.102* 0.019 -0.181* 
13: Leverage 0.167* 0.125* 0.168* 0.114* 0.054 0.248* 0.264* -0.229* 
14: Profitability -0.043 -0.070* -0.059 0.038 -0.058 -0.052 0.021 0.096* 
15: Tobin Q -0.047 -0.056 -0.069* 0.019 -0.061 -0.021 0.021 -0.032 
Variables V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 ..  
9: Bsize 1        
10: CEOduality 0.070* 1       
11: Freefperc -0.021 0.021 1      
12: Firmsize 0.412* 0.200* 0.016 1     
13: Leverage 0.178* 0.05 0.165* 0.164* 1    
14: Profitability 0.001 -0.013 -0.056 -0.250* -0.053 1   
15: Tobin Q -0.001 0.101* -0.002 -0.237* 0.041 0.711* 1 ..  
* shows significance at the.05 level 
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Table 3 
Panel data analysis with fixed-effects estimator (Model 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variables ESGscore ENVpilscore SOCpilscore GOVpilscore 
CSRcommittee 11.4*** 14.9*** 11.3*** 7.58*** 
 (13.15) (14.07) (10.06) (5.19) 
     
Bindepend 0.14*** -0.0035 0.076 0.37*** 
 (3.63) (-0.07) (1.53) (5.76) 
     
Bdiversity 0.32*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.51*** 
 (8.78) (5.31) (5.02) (8.30) 
     
Bdiligence 0.12** 0.021 0.13** 0.21** 
 (2.34) (0.35) (1.97) (2.51) 
     
Bsize -0.42** -0.064 -0.39 -0.85** 
 (-2.16) (-0.27) (-1.56) (-2.58) 
     
CEOduality -1.78 -0.52 -2.31 -2.59 
 (-1.46) (-0.35) (-1.46) (-1.26) 
     
Freefperc 0.053 -0.012 0.052 0.13** 
 (1.59) (-0.30) (1.22) (2.25) 
     
Firmsize 2.42*** 4.33*** 3.29*** -0.72 
 (3.12) (4.56) (3.28) (-0.55) 
     
Leverage 0.085*** 0.18*** 0.015 0.061 
 (3.18) (5.48) (0.44) (1.36) 
     
Profitability -0.16*** -0.032 -0.24*** -0.21** 
 (-3.03) (-0.50) (-3.51) (-2.35) 
     
Constant -36.9** -64.5*** -44.1* 2.06 
 (-2.11) (-3.01) (-1.94) (0.07) 
Firm-year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 920 920 920 920 
Adj. R2 0.45 0.43 0.24 0.07 
F-Stat 55.85*** 51.88*** 27.77*** 15.03*** 
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4 
Panel data analysis with fixed effects estimator (Model 2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
variables 
Tobin Q Profitability 
ESGscore 0.0028    -0.059*    
 (0.71)    (-1.92)    
         
ENVpilscore  0.0019    0.031   
  (0.58)    (1.22)   
         
SOCpilscore   0.00020    -0.059***  
   (0.07)    (-2.67)  
         
GOVpilscore    0.0014    -0.029* 
    (0.72)    (-1.85) 
         
CSRcommittee -0.055 -0.052 -0.031 -0.038 -1.03 -1.95*** -1.04 -1.40** 
 (-0.64) (-0.59) (-0.38) (-0.48) (-1.52) (-2.85) (-1.61) (-2.25) 
         
Bindepend -0.0064* -0.0060* -0.0060* -0.0065* -0.035 -0.045* -0.039 -0.033 
 (-1.83) (-1.74) (-1.73) (-1.84) (-1.29) (-1.67) (-1.44) (-1.20) 
         
Bdiversity -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0019 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.079*** 0.092*** 
 (-0.42) (-0.33) (-0.38) (-0.51) (2.98) (2.97) (2.78) (3.16) 
         
Bdiligence 0.0019 0.0021 0.0020 0.0018 0.072** 0.071** 0.072** 0.074** 
 (0.43) (0.49) (0.46) (0.41) (2.10) (2.05) (2.11) (2.14) 
         
Bsize 0.0033 0.0022 0.0025 0.0035 0.094 0.11 0.096 0.090 
 (0.19) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.69) (0.81) (0.71) (0.66) 
         
CEOduality 0.20* 0.19* 0.20* 0.20* -1.53* -1.75** -1.54* -1.63* 
 (1.77) (1.74) (1.81) (1.82) (-1.77) (-2.01) (-1.79) (-1.89) 
         
Freefperc -0.00021 -0.000060 -0.00014 -0.00029 -0.0031 -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0017 
 (-0.07) (-0.02) (-0.05) (-0.10) (-0.14) (-0.15) (-0.14) (-0.07) 
         
Firmsize -0.54*** -0.54*** -0.54*** -0.54*** -3.65*** -3.65*** -3.60*** -3.70*** 
 (-7.51) (-7.55) (-7.54) (-7.46) (-6.70) (-6.68) (-6.61) (-6.77) 
         
Leverage 0.0047** 0.0046* 0.0048** 0.0048** -0.064*** -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.065*** 
 (1.96) (1.89) (2.00) (1.98) (-3.43) (-3.67) (-3.66) (-3.49) 
         
Profitability 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.076***     
 (15.99) (15.93) (15.90) (15.99)     
         
Constant 12.6*** 12.6*** 12.7*** 12.6*** 89.2*** 86.6*** 88.6*** 88.6*** 
 (7.68) (7.74) (7.75) (7.71) (7.22) (7.00) (7.20) (7.18) 
N 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 
Adj. R2 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.262 -0.059 -0.062 -0.054 -0.059 
F–Stat. 28.59*** 28.58*** 28.55*** 28.60*** 8.01*** 7.86*** 8.25*** 7.99*** 
         
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5 
Robustness check for Model 1 using OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variables ESGscore ENVpilscore SOCpilscore GOVpilscore 
CSRcommittee 17.8*** 22.4*** 20.3*** 9.63*** 
 (22.36) (21.67) (18.25) (7.38) 
     
Bindepend 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.31*** 0.042 
 (6.80) (3.89) (9.13) (1.07) 
     
Bdiversity 0.32*** 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.48*** 
 (10.22) (5.80) (5.90) (9.43) 
     
Bdiligence 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.19*** 0.25*** 
 (6.20) (5.54) (3.54) (3.96) 
     
Bsize 0.29* 0.78*** 0.54** -0.54** 
 (1.92) (3.91) (2.52) (-2.14) 
     
CEOduality 0.39 4.17*** -4.52*** 1.91 
 (0.52) (4.19) (-4.22) (1.53) 
     
Freefperc 0.032* 0.0087 0.060*** 0.025 
 (1.93) (0.41) (2.60) (0.91) 
     
Firmsize 3.21*** 3.41*** 3.34*** 2.83*** 
 (10.99) (8.97) (8.17) (5.91) 
     
Leverage 0.0058 0.0088 -0.0026 0.012 
 (0.37) (0.42) (-0.12) (0.47) 
     
Profitability 0.11** 0.027 0.075 0.25*** 
 (2.18) (0.41) (1.05) (2.96) 
     
Constant -72.7*** -81.3*** -81.7*** -52.6*** 
 (-9.55) (-8.20) (-7.66) (-4.21) 
N 920 920 920 920 
Adj. R2 0.631 0.581 0.544 0.242 
F-Stat. 157.97*** 128.69*** 110.65*** 30.32*** 
     
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6 
Robustness check for Model 2 using OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
Variables 
Tobin Q Profitability 
ESGscore 0.0038    0.047**    
 (1.18)    (2.18)    
         
ENVpilscore  0.0031    0.0067   
  (1.25)    (0.41)   
         
SOCpilscore   0.0014    0.016  
   (0.62)    (1.05)  
         
GOVpilscore    0.0013    0.039*** 
    (0.63)    (2.96) 
         
CSRcommittee -0.0082 -0.010 0.031 0.048 -1.48** -0.80 -0.97 -1.01* 
 (-0.08) (-0.11) (0.34) (0.59) (-2.30) (-1.25) (-1.61) (-1.91) 
         
Bindepend -0.0029 -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.0024 -0.023 -0.016 -0.021 -0.017 
 (-1.22) (-1.14) (-1.12) (-1.01) (-1.45) (-1.04) (-1.26) (-1.09) 
         
Bdiversity -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.00073 -0.00097 0.012 0.026 0.023 0.0086 
 (-0.49) (-0.35) (-0.24) (-0.30) (0.58) (1.25) (1.13) (0.41) 
         
Bdiligence -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.044* 0.053** 0.052** 0.045* 
 (-2.82) (-2.82) (-2.69) (-2.70) (1.69) (2.07) (2.04) (1.77) 
         
Bsize 0.0087 0.0074 0.0090 0.010 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.42*** 
 (0.58) (0.49) (0.60) (0.70) (3.88) (3.96) (3.94) (4.23) 
         
CEOduality 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 1.04** 1.03** 1.13** 0.98** 
 (4.24) (4.05) (4.31) (4.22) (2.09) (2.06) (2.26) (1.97) 
         
Freefperc 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 -0.0081 -0.0067 -0.0076 -0.0076 
 (0.77) (0.83) (0.79) (0.83) (-0.76) (-0.62) (-0.71) (-0.70) 
         
Firmsize -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -1.58*** -1.46*** -1.49*** -1.53*** 
 (-4.60) (-4.64) (-4.47) (-4.50) (-8.10) (-7.58) (-7.80) (-8.23) 
         
Leverage 0.0037** 0.0037** 0.0037** 0.0037** -0.018* -0.017* -0.017* -0.018* 
 (2.37) (2.37) (2.39) (2.38) (-1.71) (-1.69) (-1.68) (-1.73) 
         
Profitability 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***     
 (29.19) (29.33) (29.29) (29.13)     
         
Constant 4.38*** 4.36*** 4.22*** 4.17*** 34.8*** 32.1*** 32.9*** 33.3*** 
 (5.60) (5.63) (5.48) (5.53) (6.88) (6.39) (6.58) (6.85) 
N 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 
Adj. R2 0.530 0.530 0.529 0.529 0.086 0.082 0.082 0.090 
F-Stat. 95.15 95.19 94.96 94.96 9.66 9.15 9.26 10.10 
         
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
